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IN THE
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R esp'Ondents.

NO. 6232

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
This is an appeal from the District Court for Utah
County.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The complaint alleges the execution and delivery by
defendants and respondents to plaintiff of a contract for
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the .sale of the land described, consisting of about 500
acres of land located in Utah County. The contract is
attached to the complaint as an exhibit. It is specifically
alleged that at the time of the execution of the agreement
the sellers were not the owners of the land which they
had contracted to sell. The contract contained the following provision:
''First parties agree to furnish, at their own expense, and deliver same to second party on or before October first 1930, an Abstract of title to said
property continued to date, and showing the fee and
unencumbered, marketable title thereto in .said first
parties, and said second party shall be entitled to
30 days after same is furnished in which to examine
and accept the title thereto.''
and it provided for the payment upon execution of the
contract the sum of $2000.00, receipt of which is acknowledged, and $6000.00 in installments of $1000.00 beginning November 30th 1931 and $1000.00 a year thereafter
until the contract would be paid in full. Plaintiff paid,
it is alleged, $2561.33 in payments at irregular intervals
and in amounts differing from that provided for in the
contract. Subsequently the parties made another agreement, supplementing the fir.st, by the terms of which the
sellers were relieved of the obligation to make good the
title to a portion of the lands comprising 93.87 acres,
p.rovided title to the balance of the land was cleared with
deeds from the estate of one George G. Kelly. This contract was dated January 28, 1932 and appears on Page
26 of the abstract. This agreement was made necessary
2
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by the fact that the estate of George G. Kelly owned an
undivided one fifth interest in the land and hence until
there was a division the entire tract was. involved with
the Kelly estate. The sellers were, from the very beginning, in default in that they failed to furnish an abstract as provided by the contract, and were, during· all
of the time, in default because they could not show title.
The memorandum agreement provided a way out for the
sellers, had they followed it up by exchanging deeds with
the Kelly estate, but they failed to do so and in October,
1933, Reuben G. Jolley died and the property passed to
his administrator for the purpose of administration.
While the sellers were thus in default, beginning March,
1937, they started serving notices of res.cission and forfeiture by which they specified defaults in payment on
the part of the buyer; demanded payment and upon
failure to comply there was a declaration that the contract was terminated. (Abs. 30.)

In June of 1937 the appellant, having an op:portunity
to sell the property if he could procure title, employed
J. W. Stringfellow, a lawyer of Salt Lake City, to assist
him in his efforts to procure title to the property and
together with Mr. Stringfellow, he went to Provo to examine the records, procure title if possible and in connection therewith to consummate the sale of the property
for a sum largely in exee.ss of the amount he owed. He
was told that M. R. Straw of the firm of Christensen,
Straw and Christensen, was handling the Jolley Estate
matter and he would have to see him. Mr. Stringfellow
testified with respect to the conference as follows:

.3
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"A. 'Mr. Straw said that he would call up Mr.
Jolley with respect to letting us have the abstract.
He did. And he said to the party on the other end,
''Mr. Naylor and Judge Stringfellow are here. They
.say they have a purchaser for the ranch, but it is
necessary for them to have the abstract." After a
pause, I should say two or three minutes., he followe·d ~p, ''Well, they say it is a bona fide purchaser,
and surely no one will buy the property without
an opportunity to look at the abstract and to examine its title, and we ought to let them have it."
After a paus.e of another few minutes, he hung up
and he said that Mr. Jolley said that Mr. Naylor
could not have the abstract but that Stringfellow
could. But I was to return it after a period of time,
and I would be held responsible for its return. I
do not recall as to the length of time that we were to
have it. And he said that he would bring the abstract down that afternoon. That it was now in
the safety deposit box and that he couldn't get at
it. He said he preferred to have the abstract brought
to date here because he knew an abstracter who had
done a lot of work for him and he could get some
concession on the price. That he would give it to
the abstracter, find the bill-we had previously
agreed if they would do that we would pay the cost
of bringing it to date. That he would send us the
bill. We were to send him the money, and then he
would s.end us the abstract.'
Q. After that conversation did you hear any
further from Mr. Straw other than the letter?
A. Nothing more than the letter which he sent
the next day excusing himself from sending the abstract.
Q.. Is that all your connection with the letter?
A. That IS my whole connection with the
matter.''

.,,
''
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The letter referred to in the conversation is as. follows:
''June 4, 1937
J. W. Stringfellow,
310 Utah Oil Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
Dear Sir:
In the matter of Jolley, et-al vs. Naylor, Mrs.
Jolley is a p·arty of interest u·nder the contract and
as the situation res.olves itself, I find myself unable
to secure the Abstract for delivery to you or to the
abstractor. If Naylor is a bona fide purchaser, it is
possible that the Abstract may be examined here for
the purpose of determining what the title is in respect to the lands under contract, but under the circumstances, I am not able to control the situation
nor s.pecifically state what Naylor may be able to
exp·ect in the nature of cooperation under the facts
in the case. If it is possible for Naylor to make the
deal contemplated, or any deal with respect to the
cleanup· of the matter, I shall do all that I personally can to facilitate such action.
Regretting ~y inability to comply. with the request made, I am,
Very truly yours,
Christensen, Straw &
Christensen.
MRS:HO''
By Straw.
On July 14th the sellers executed and delivered to the
executors of George G. Kelly, a deed to 93.87 acres of
land covered by the Naylor contract and on July 23, 1937,
executors of the Kelly Estate executed and delivered to
the executors of the Jolley Estate, a deed to the balance
of the property. Until that time title to the property

5
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s:old was not in· the Jolley Estate and after that, 93.87
acre.s, of land was wholly withdrawn from the contract,
with competent·evidence of these facts before the court,
upon motion of the defendants, the court made and entered its judgment of nonsuit to· which exception wa~
taken.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
The appellant assigned as error:
1. The entry of the judgment of nonsuit for the reason that the sellers were not the owners of the land .solei
at the· time they made the contract and that they failed
and refused at all times to furnish an abstract of title
and that it was not therefore competent for them to
rescind the contract while thus in default.
2. That the court erred in holding that the sellers
could and did terminate the contract while in default in
not owning the property and in failing to furnish an
abstract of title, and further, that the appellant was not
entitled to an abstract showing a clear title and to use
the contract for the purpose of financing the purchase
of the property, and generally, that the court erred in
making and entering judgment of nonsuit. (Abstract
53.)

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
From the foregoing hrief statement. the court will
observe that the parties by their contract made the
marketable title to the real estate with an abstract an
essential provision of the contract.
6
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To avoid confusion we point out at the very beginning
the fact that an abstract which was furnished to a small
part of the property was not and is not the abstract which
the sellers undertook to deliver showing clear title to
the larger tract of land. An abstract was exhibited after
title to a small part of the land was cleared up but as
observed by the letter from M. R. Straw to J. W. Stringfellow the abstract covering the land one-fifth of which
was owned by the Kelly Estate was not furnished.and as
late as June 4, 1937, the sellers refused to furnish it.
We repeat here for the purpose of clarity that the seller
could not furnish an abstract showing clear title to this
property even after the contract. under which Naylor
released Jolley from conveying 93.87 acres was made.
An abstract would not have cleared up· the controversy
because the Kelly E.state had an undivided one-fifth interest in the entire tract and although the estate relinquished its claim in consideration of the 93.87 acres that
was not done until long after the seller served notice of
the rescission of the contract.
For the equitable consideration of the court we point
to the further fact that apparently Naylor was so anxious
to get the prop·erty where he could handle it after he had
paid $4561.33 on the purchase price of $8000.00 that he
signed the contract waiving the conveyance of the 93.87
acres without any .stated consideration. In equity he was
entitled to have the purchase price reduced proportionatel.y. That equity, however, by the seller was completely ignored. As shown by the testimony, Naylor
built one mile of wire fence at the alleged expense of

7
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$441.00, erected a livestock barn at the expense of
$1500.00, improved the dwelling house at an expense of
$150.00, cleared brush from land and put it to intensive
cultivation at an expense of $500.00, and made other improvements by way of preparing the land for seeding and
cropping at, an expense of $1000.00. The seller, then
while in default in not furnishing the abstract and procuring the title and in not giving possession to the entire tract ruthlessly and forcefully took possession of the
property. The repudiation of the contract with the seller
had gone so far that Naylor could do nothing but accept
the rescission and sue for damages. The facts as thus
stated are disclosed by the pleadings and by the testimony. It is true that an old building on the premises
burned down' and Naylor collected some insurance which
he used in the erection of the new barn and it is true also
that he was so far wrecked financially by the contract,
that he was unable to pay for some of the material that
went into the barn but that is all beside the question now
before the court. The defendants offered no testimony
and the court made judgment of non-suit upon the uncontradicted evidence of the plaintiff and J. vV. Stringfellow. In doing so the court must have concluded that
the provision of the contract with respect to the title of
the land and an abstract showing clear title were unilnportant provisions which the sellers were at liberty to
disregard, or that the sellers while not only in default in
the performance of that part of their engag_ement, but
after they had exp,ressly repudiated the obligation to
furnish an abstract showing clear title could lawfully

8
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rescind the contract and forfeit all payments made in
money and all improvements to the property. The cou·rt
was wrong on both of these propositions. It goes without saying that the parties by their contract could make
the delivery of an abstract showing clear title an essential provision of the contract, in fact, there was an implied obligation on the part of the sellers to furnish title
to the property. If the mere matter of bringing up an
abstract were all that was involved, equity might look
with some consideration· upon the attitude of the sellers
but that was not the trouble. Naylor had an opportunity
to sell the property and to save himself and perhaps
make some profit. He employed a reputable attorney to
assist him to get the title. They went to Provo, offered
to have the abstract brought up· to date and to pay the
expense of it, but the sellers would not even pennit him to
take on that obligation in addition to his contract obligations. The letter from Straw, attorney for the sellers,
is a clear repudiation of that essential provision of the
contract. There was a very good reason why the sellers
refused to permit an examination of the abstract for as
learned by Stringfellow upon examination of the records
in the Recorder's office, the sellers did not have the title
and if they had furnished an abstract and if it had been
brought to date, it would have disclosed the fact that the
Kelly Estate owned an undivided one-fifth of the larger
tract of land. Stringfellow found that and Naylor was
then compelled to drop his contract of sale although he
had paid a substantial part of the purchase price of the
property. It was not until the mutual executors deeds
,g

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

were given by the Jolley Estate to the Kelly Estate and
the Kelly Estate to the Jolley E:state on July 14, and July
23, 1937, respectively, that the title to the land excepting
the 93.87 ac.res was free from this objection and it is not
known even to this date whether there were other serious
difficulties with the title to the property because Naylor
has never had the o,pportunity to examine another abstract.
It thus appears to be elear from the contract that
Jolley was at all times in default, and while Naylor was
likewise in default as to the time and amounts of payments, still he had made payments aggregating more than
50% of the contract price of the land and the sellers being thus in default from the very beginning were not
under the terms of the contract or in law in a position to
rescind without subjecting themselves to damages for
the breach of the contract.

.
IS:

The rule as. laid down in 2 Black on Rescission 553,
"The right to rescind a contract on the ground
of failure of performance by the other party, delay
in performance, want or failure of title, insufficient
or incomplete performance, breach of conditions or
of warranties, or for other such causes, cannot be
claimed by a party who is himself in default in the
performance of anry of the obligations imposed upon
him by the contract. Where a complainant, seeking
the rescission of a contract, has not done all that he
stipulated to do, or ha.s not placed himself in a situation to be ready to do so, upon compliance of the
other ,p.a.rty, the court will not interpose in his behalf. Thus:, a vendor who is in default for failing
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to furnish a good title may not terminate the rights
of the purchaser.''
The text is supported by the following cases:
Price vs. Immel, 48 Colorado 163, 109 Pacific 941 ;
King vs. Ruckman, 24 New Jersey Equity 556.

In the latter case under a contract not ess.entially
different from the contract before the court, the court
said:
''It is impracticable to execute the contract in this
particular, except upon the Doctrine of Cy P·res. The
decree in this feature of it goes upon the theory that
the stipulation for time for the payment of the residium of the price after the acquisition of the· title by
the purchaser was a substantial part of the agreement and it seems to me that this is well founded in
the merits of the case. After the vendee gets title
and the possession, he is then in a position to turn
the land to account in the way of raising money.''
''He can either in whole or in p-art sell or mortgage it. The compla.inant in this case w~as by force
of this agreement entitled to this advatntager and I
entirely assent to the view of the Vice Chancellor
that he ought not to be deprived of it by the misconduct of the other party.''
The sentence which we have italicized is particularly
ap·plica ble.
Central Lumber Company vs. Arkansas Valley
Lumber Company, Kansas, 119 Pacific 321.
This case involves lumber but the principle is the
same. The court said :
11
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''If the seller 'had been guilty of the first breach
of the contract and be himself in default which has
not been waived, he cannot claim the right to rescind
because payment for delivery .subsequent to his default had been withheld.''
Naylor, as above observed, paid more than 50% of
the purcha.se price of the property. He had made extensive imp.rovements and that is not denied. For the purpose of this hearing it is not important that the improvements were of a value less than the amounts stated for
the court below would not go into the value of improvements at all. He was thus in a position, had the title
been perfected to .sell as he proposed to a purchaser,
then ready to buy or to mortgage and to pay up the balance due on the purchase price. But when he attempted
to do so he was ruthlessly ejected from the premises and
all of his payments and improvements forfeited by the
sellers who were at all times in default. That was not
only inequitable but as a matter of law, it constituted an
actionable breach of contract.
Cases may be cited to the effect that the buyer cannot demand an abstract showing clear title when he is in
default in his payments, but such cases are not in point
because in this case the contract provided for the abstract
and title.
The judgment of non-suit should be set aside and the
case tried on its merits.
Respectfully submitted,
··············-············· ...................................................................._................---·································
..............................................

-........................•_........................._................-·······-···················-·····
Atto'rneys for Appellant.
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